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Intelligent machines, care work and the nature of practical 
reasoning 
Final Draft accepted by Nursing Ethics 
Angus Robson 
 ‘ZOEY. Now you. Name three things you and your partner appear to have 
in common. 
ROBOT. (He scans her quickly as if assessing her) Easy. Number One: the 
rain. You don’t like it, and I am not waterproof, and I am liable to short-
circuit in the rain. Number two: the past: you tend to forget yours, and I 
don’t have one. Number Three: It appears as though we are connected to 
the same Wi-Fi router. Those are three commonalities. 
ZOEY. Ha-ha! That’s true.’ 1(p.468) 
‘Care is surely a form of labor. But it is also much more. The labor of care 
is already relational, and for the most part cannot be replaced by machines 
in the way that so much other labor can.’ 2(p.36) 
Introduction 
The first extract above is taken from a play performed as part of an applied theatre 
research project designed by Jochum et al. 1 to investigate audience reactions to human 
interaction with a care robot. The situation of the play is that a woman has suffered a brain 
injury which affects her short term memory, and she is given a NAO social robot to assist 
with day-to-day living and to provide companionship. The plotline of the simple two-
character script follows the structure of Aron’s 3 ‘How to fall in love in thirty six questions’. 
There appears to be some dissonance between the assumptions of this dialogue and the 
second extract from Held 2. 
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The development of robots in care work is contentious, and has attracted 
considerable academic interest 4. Ethical concerns do not only involve the well-being of 
end users, regarding deception, objectification or loss of privacy 5, 6; they also include the 
potential erosion of caregiving as a central feature of human moral life 7, 8. The latter issue 
is the focus of this article. Specifically, I explore the idea that machines can be moral 
agents, in the context of care.  
In order to do so, I make use of the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre, who offers 
a distinctive approach to ethics. His philosophy is practice-led, in the sense that it does not 
offer any general theories of ‘what to do’. Rather he offers a way of looking at practices 
and other social structures which enable us to answer the question, ‘What should we do?’ 
on the basis of practical experience of particular contexts. He is interested in social 
structures as enablers of (or barriers to) moral agency, and offers a richly textured 
understanding of the relationship between ethics and social science.  
The argument of the current article proceeds in three stages. First, the basic problem 
is stated. I then set out a four part framework derived from some of MacIntyre’s central 
ideas of the way that human moral agency and practical reasoning are developed. That 
framework is used to examine the claim that machines might exercise some level of moral 
agency, including the possibility that they might do care work. I argue that certain kinds of 
social structure, including relationships of care, are central to moral development, that 
machines cannot participate in crucial aspects of these and, consequently, that machines 
cannot develop as moral agents. Finally, I draw some conclusions about the nature of 
practical reason in care and the limitations of technology. I argue further that, since 
machines cannot do care work, the term ‘care robot’ should be resisted. I propose some 
practical implications for the position of care practitioners in design and development of 
new technologies. 
The nature of the problem 
Advances in machine intelligence have been accompanied by remarkable claims 
for their moral status. It is understandable that commercial developers should market their 
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products as ‘emotionally sensitive’ or ‘kindly’ or that journalists should report this in 
anthropomorphic language 9, 10. It is perhaps more surprising that prominent academics go 
much further, to claim that intelligent machines should be recognised as moral agents, and 
that they may have a legitimate claim to robot rights 11, 12.  
These two discourses, one in commercial and popular media, the other in academic 
debate, appear to be connected. As developers produce machines whose behaviour and 
appearance more and more closely mimics human action and expression, the more likely 
it is that anthropomorphic language will be used to describe those machines and that human 
attributes will be assigned to them. So, in the commercial and popular sphere, talk of 
‘machines which lift people’ or ‘communicate information’, bleeds over into talk of ‘care 
robots’ and ‘emotional response’, while in the academic sphere, ‘autonomous action’ 
becomes ‘agency’ and then ‘moral agency’. 
For example, Floridi 13, in summarising what he means by ‘information ethics’, 
argues that information systems have both moral agency (they can act well or badly, 
morally) and moral patiency (they deserve moral consideration or rights), and he infers 
from this that they are accountable for their actions, even if they cannot be responsible for 
them. Others have proposed models of extended agency, such that responsibility for an 
event involving a machine may be distributed across a network of components including 
humans and non-humans 14. Such debates provide some basic ontological challenges, by 
questioning our assumptions about the moral nature of human beings compared to 
machines. 
A recent review of literature on the ethics of care robots in elder care recommends 
broadening our ethical landscape to include the moral agency of robot technology 4. In this 
the authors explicitly follow Gunkel 15. They qualify agency here as intended not in the 
sense of machines exercising moral reasoning, but in the sense of them influencing human 
moral reasoning.  However, it is exactly questions of extending moral agency and patiency, 
in the sense of moral decision making and moral consideration, that Gunkel, Floridi and 
others are interested in. 
To be clear, the problem is not the development and introduction of intelligent 
machines in the context of care. The benefits of emerging technologies in healthcare are 
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well established 16. The problem is one of exaggeration, which may lead to poor design and 
use. If it is accepted that intelligent machines should be recognised as exercising some form 
of extended moral agency, being accountable for their actions or sharing responsibility, or 
if it is imagined that they are capable of providing care or companionship, then this will 
affect the way that they are developed, marketed and used in care settings. 
In order to understand the moral limitations of technology, it is useful to first have 
some idea of the basis of the moral capacities of human beings. The context of care brings 
such issues into sharp focus. In this respect, I broadly agree with O’Brolcháin 8, who also 
makes use of MacIntyre. However, I do not share the assumption that robots in care 
contexts such as dementia need necessarily displace human caring. My argument is that we 
need to be clear about the limitations of technology in order to avoid such displacement, 
and I seek to position the topic of care in MacIntyre’s wider philosophy of practical reason. 
The section below gives a very condensed overview of the kind of structures which 
MacIntyre thinks are essential for human moral development – in Aristotelian terms, the 
development of practical reason. 
A MacIntyrean four-part scheme 
MacIntyre does not seek to describe a complete system of practical reasoning. 
However, he does set out his ideas of the kinds of structure which we need, in order to 
develop as practical reasoners. Here I pick out four in particular: practices, traditions, the 
narrative unity of a human life and intimate relationships of care and dependency. The first 
three are articulated in After Virtue and subsequent books, and the fourth in Dependent 
Rational Animals. 
Practices 
MacIntyre’s idea of practices has been widely discussed elsewhere, including in the 
context of health care and more specifically nursing 17-19. Here I give only a brief indication 
of the concept. 
‘By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form 
of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
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internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, 
are systematically extended.’ 20 (p.187) 
The above is perhaps the most quoted passage from MacIntyre’s writing. He 
illustrates the idea of a practice through the example of a child learning to play chess, a 
process whereby the child might be given reasons to learn how to play chess first by means 
of rewards, such as candy, which are extraneous to the game of chess; if the child then 
persists and learns to play the game moderately well, he or she may then learn to enjoy the 
game for its own sake. Learning to enjoy the game for its own sake involves beginning to 
recognise certain goods which are specific to chess, a ‘particular kind of analytic skill, 
strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons, reasons now not for 
winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess 
demands’ 20 (p.188).  
MacIntyre calls these ‘internal goods’. He extends his discussion to a range of 
practices, such as farming, fishing, portrait painting, medicine, physics etc., and 
distinguishes between the internal goods of practices which are co-operative and non-
exclusive, with external goods of money, status and so on. The latter are typically objects 
of competition within and among organisations, in the shape of profits, salaries, outputs or 
league tables. His initial characterisation of virtue is then a human quality which enables 
one to appreciate and pursue the internal goods of practices. 
Traditions 
The idea of practices only provides MacIntyre’s first step in exploring the basis of 
the way that human beings develop and exercise practical reason and the virtues on which 
it depends. Another element of MacIntyre’s scheme is the idea of the moral traditions in 
which we find ourselves. Practical reasoners are always located in moral communities of 
some sort. It is through our membership of and role within such communities that we 
develop our sense of what a good life might mean, what the virtues are for, and what our 
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own purposes and ends might be 21, 22. Such communities may be understood at many 
different levels 23, 24, all the way from the large social movements of national and religious 
cultures, through to particular ways of life in towns and workplaces, and including the 
traditions of particular practices.  
These kinds of social structure embody shared ideas of what it means to live well 
and act well in particular circumstances, and through them we develop practical reasoning 
25. We inherit from such moral traditions our sense of right and wrong and, through our 
actions and words, we shape not only our own development as practical reasoners but also, 
in turn, the development of those same traditions. MacIntyre characterises traditions as 
sources not only of agreement, but also of ongoing arguments about those agreements. 
The narrative unity of a human life 
The third key element which he introduces in After Virtue is the narrative unity of 
a human life, which gives meaning to the activities in which that life is engaged. The moral 
significance of any particular action depends not only on the circumstances of the act, but 
also on the intentions of the actor, which depend in turn on the larger story of that person’s 
life, their history and their ultimate goals. 
This is closely connected with the Aristotelian ideas of eudaimonia and telos. 
Eudaimonia, although often translated as happiness, does not equate to a transient affective 
state, as in, for instance, feeling happy about a new job; rather, it refers to flourishing or 
living well over the span of a whole life 26, 27. What it is to live well depends on one’s telos, 
or purpose in life. This requires a conception of the overall good at which one’s life should 
aim, and MacIntyre regards the quest for the good as itself a foundation of the good life: 
‘It is in looking for a conception of the good which will enable us to 
order other goods, for a conception of the good which will enable us to 
extend our understanding of the purpose and content of the virtues, for a 
conception of the good which will enable us to understand the place of 
integrity and constancy in life, that we initially define the kind of life which 
is a quest for the good.’ 20 (p.219) 
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These three elements of the scheme are all linked in the exercise of moral agency. 
The narrative quest for the good in the case of some particular person can only be 
understood in the light of their connection to particular communities and practices. 
Practices, meanwhile, generally imply moral traditions of some sort, insomuch as they have 
their own histories and standards, shared between communities of practitioners. As 
MacIntyre 20 (p.216) puts it: ‘I can only answer the question “What am I to do?” if I can 
answer the prior question “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” 
Intimate relationships of care and dependency 
The fourth element of the scheme proposed here is taken from later in MacIntyre’s 
writing. In Dependent Rational Animals 28, he begins by remarking on the importance of 
the work of Kittay 29, Held 30 and other writers in feminist ethics and ethics of care, and 
from that point builds a Thomistic argument for the importance of virtues of acknowledged 
vulnerability. Here, I emphasise ethics of care, but the account remains compatible with 
MacIntyre’s. 
Aristotelian virtue ethics is relational in the sense that it places the moral agent in 
the context of social relations, but ethics of care is relational in a stronger sense. Here, 
moral value is primarily located, not in moral agents, but in the relationships between them, 
specifically relationships of dependency and care.  The focus is ‘on the compelling moral 
salience of attending to and meeting the needs of particular others for whom we take 
responsibility’ (Held, 2006, p.10). 
Ethics of care sees close relationships of dependency and vulnerability as 
paradigmatic for morality. It is thus concerned, in the first instance, with the basic human 
need to care and be cared for by others. Most obviously this applies at those times of life 
where vulnerability is most marked, for instance in infancy, sickness, disability and old 
age, but it also applies throughout our lives, insomuch as we continue to need others to care 
for us and about us 31. These two ideas of caring about and caring for are basic, and both 
are important for good care32. Caring for implies labour, and it is central to the feminist 
concerns of many care ethics authors that the activities, labour and practice of care should 
be recognised as fundamental to human well-being 29, 32. 
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Ethics of care is generally (though not universally) regarded as distinct from virtue 
ethics 33, but one key point of agreement is that emotions are vital in accounting for moral 
life 2, 34. In ethics of care, this tends to focus on particular emotions, such as sympathy, 
which are indispensable for our ability to care for and about others, but it also extends to 
other emotions such as anger or fear. That a parent should fear for his child in appropriate 
circumstances, for instance, is basic to his ability to care for her. 
The human experience of vulnerability and dependence and the human response to 
that experience in caring for others is, MacIntyre argues, the context in which moral 
development arises. Our development as practical reasoners is a process of emergence from 
the protection of carers, particularly parents, but also friends and teachers, into an 
increasingly independent position of decision, action and responsibility, in which we retain, 
nevertheless, our awareness and acknowledgement of our vulnerability and dependence on 
each other. 
The scheme as a whole 
It is important to keep MacIntyre’s work in view as a complex whole. Here I have 
identified four key structural themes, which in itself risks oversimplifying things. However, 
it has the merit of pointing out an important central feature of the way that MacIntyre’s 
work has progressed, which might be characterised as a naturalist turn and to some extent 
a domestic one. 
In his major books from the 1980s to mid 1990s 21, 35, 36 MacIntyre is mainly focused 
on social structures which are large scale and in the public sphere. There is mention of 
small scale examples and the domestic sphere (family life is listed as a practice), but the 
bulk of discussion is taken up with grand themes and historical movements: the virtues at 
Athens, the Rule of Benedict, the Scottish Enlightenment, Thomism, and so on. 
His later books 24, 28, 37 show more interest in the personal and domestic. This 
includes the focus on the domestic sphere as discussed above, and extends to an interest in 
particular life narratives as exemplars of the way that individuals exercise practical 
rationality. 
The new departure in Dependent Rational Animals is also notable because it is a 
work of Aristotelian naturalism, and thus different to the sociological and historical 
Intelligent machines, care work 
9 
 
 
emphasis of much of his earlier work 38, 39. In After Virtue, MacIntyre famously rejected 
Aristotle’s metaphysical biology as a starting point for an account of ethics based in human 
nature. In its place he proposed an account based on social practice. In Dependent Natural 
Animals, by contrast, the animal nature of human beings is front and centre. The book has 
the same basic purpose as Philippa Foot’s 40, Natural Goodness, albeit that its argument is 
differently directed. Both seek a bedrock for moral philosophy in facts of human nature, 
which lie beyond the mutability of human practice. For both Foot and MacIntyre at this 
point, human beings have an animal nature which is generic is to their species, and on 
which rival traditions of moral enquiry are founded. 
This progression becomes critical when considering the moral life of humans and 
machines. Questions of moral agency become not only ones of practice, culture, behaviour, 
language, and so on. They are also ontological questions: What basic features of the nature 
of human beings require and are required by moral agency? What other kinds of being have 
similar features? 
Machines and moral agency  
If machines are to be able to exercise moral agency, they need to be able to exercise 
practical reasoning, and if they are to develop as practical reasoners, they need to be able 
to learn from experience 41. The question thus arises: will machines be able to participate 
in the kinds of experiences which are likely to assist that development? We can position 
this in the light of the four part scheme outlined above. 
First, what are the prospects for machines to be able to participate in practices? It 
is initially tempting to say that machines can win at games, but have no understanding of 
the internal goods of practices. To some extent this would be true. Like MacIntyre’s chess 
playing child, machines are inclined to win by any means and this often involves subverting 
the game, rather than excelling in it. (For an entertaining account of this tendency, see 
Lehman et al. 42.)  
However, the experiences of human chess and Go champions are increasingly that 
computers have begun to play these games in innovative ways that have, in effect, extended 
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the goods of the practice 43, 44. If we are then inclined to admit some level of involvement 
in some practices, but to say that these examples are suspiciously solo activities with very 
limited physicality, and question whether any meaningful social practice is evident, we 
should remember that robot football is a developing research field, already producing real 
teams of robo-footballers 45. 
Something like the same applies to machine participation in traditions. Certainly, 
machines find themselves working within traditions of scientific enquiry and they are, by 
their presence, contributing to the development of those traditions. MacIntyre characterises 
moral traditions not only as sets of assumptions which are handed down, but also as 
ongoing arguments about what is good or right to do. Whether machines will be able to 
participate in such moral traditions will largely depend on whether human beings equip 
them to do so, but already IBM’s Project Debater is a development in this direction, as is 
the medical ethics programme MedEthEx 46, 47. 
The narrative unity of a life appears to be more of a challenge for machines. 
Narrative is not in itself a barrier; machines can tell stories. However, the quest for the 
good is problematic and unity of life even more so. This is not only a question of 
embodiment, but also of the connectivity between bodies and minds. Organic life produces 
unique individuals with unique histories and purposes. As individual human beings, we are 
strictly limited to our particular lives. Machines are not so constrained. Software can be 
duplicated and hardware can be re-purposed. Because machines (or software systems) are 
not embodied in anything like the way that organic life is, it is not at all clear that machines 
can be individuated in anything like the way that organic beings are. Our perceptions of 
this can, of course, be manipulated, and it will be in the commercial interest of robot 
manufacturers to sell individualised robot pets, with apparently unique personalities and 
histories, but they will still lack the unity of life of real pets. 
Perhaps the greatest challenge for claims of machine morality presented by 
MacIntyre’s philosophy is the grounding of practical reason in intimate relationships of 
dependency and vulnerability. MacIntyre’s position is not anthropocentric. Human beings 
are not automatically privileged as moral beings, and claims to practical reasoning are open 
to other forms of animal life. Machines, however, seem to be in some difficulties here, 
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since there is no sign that machines can develop relationships of care in anything like the 
way that humans and other animals do. 
If MacIntyre and care ethicists are right, our capacities for moral life are founded 
in intimate relationships involving the giving and receiving of care, which are rooted in our 
nature as socially interdependent and vulnerable animals. Because machines cannot 
participate in this kind of vulnerability, whilst they can be programmed to provide a care-
related service for somebody, they cannot care about others in the same way that humans 
can 48. 
It may then be tempting to say that machines can care for people, but not about 
them, because they can participate in care labour, even if they are incapable of the relational 
engagement usually implied by care. However, whilst machines certainly can and do assist 
in care work, it is misleading to speak of machines as caring for anyone, for two principal 
reasons, one conceptual and one practical. 
First, it is central to the idea of care ethics, that care is relational 2, 31, 49. The work 
of caring for someone cannot be disassociated from the relational commitment implied in 
caring about. This is not to say that carers cannot carry on with their care work in a reduced, 
instrumental way, even when they do not feel like they care about someone. It is just to say 
that relational commitment must be there as the context in which care work is understood. 
Second, it is a practical requirement of caring for someone, that the carer should be 
able to understand and respond to the needs of that person 50. This capability is a central 
feature of practical reasoning. It implies not only sensitivity to the needs of others, but also 
the ability to reason with regard to the flourishing of others as well as oneself. A carer 
needs to be able to understand what might be in someone else’s best interests in some 
particular moment.  
Consequently, two immediate limitations need to be acknowledged when 
considering the role of machines in contexts of care. First, machines cannot be carers in a 
relational and conceptual sense. Second, they cannot care for in a practical sense. 
Machines, in short, cannot themselves do care work. All they can do is to provide 
technological assistance to human carers in their care work. 
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The limits of technology and the primacy of care practices 
All this has consequences for how we approach the ethics of machines in a care 
context and how technology is designed and developed. Some authors worry, rightly, that 
care robots will not provide good care 51, 52. The argument above is, more fundamentally, 
that robots cannot really do care work at all, for the same reasons that they cannot develop 
as moral agents. 
On this view, we should resist the term ‘care robot’, because it already implies that 
machines can do care work. Mimicry and deception are well-articulated as potential 
problems with regard to the use of robots in care settings 5, 6. My contention here is that 
deception is already present in the language of ‘care robots’. The phrase itself blurs lines. 
This is similar to the blurring implied in the phrase ‘artificial moral agency’. However, it 
is a key difference between usage of those two terms that ‘artificial moral agency’ is  widely 
challenged 53 where ‘care robot’ generally is not. We should perhaps insist that, strictly 
speaking, there are no such things as care robots1. 
Another key conclusion from the foregoing analysis concerns not just language, but 
ontology. It appears that machines (however they are spoken of, as robots, computers or 
artificial intelligence) are not the kind of entities which can care, develop practical 
rationality or exercise moral agency.  
This is based on practical rather than logical premises. Whilst there may be 
plausibility to claims of some level of participation in some of the structures of practical 
reasoning as set out by MacIntyre, there is no plausible claim that machines can, or will 
any time soon, participate adequately across the range. They lack a locus in the kind of life 
experiences which enable moral development. Most obviously, they cannot experience the 
narrative unity of a life, and they cannot form intimate relationships of care. It also appears 
                                                 
 
1 The same is not true of some other categories of advanced and intelligent systems. For instance, 
‘Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems’ are fully capable of killing people. No misrepresentation is implied 
in this label or the vernacular phrase ‘killer robots’. A falling rock, a machine or a cow with a calf can all kill 
someone, but only the cow is capable of caring. 
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that these are connected. An entity which does not have a bounded and individuated life 
and death cannot experience intimate relationships of care and vulnerability in anything 
like the way that animals can. 
Ontological assumptions are, of course, also cultural ones 2. For instance, it appears 
that the assumptions of Japanese and North American cultures with regard to robots may 
be rather different 54. It is a key part of MacIntyre’s thinking on traditions that there will 
be such differences, often encoded in everyday language, and that critique of one’s own or 
other cultural traditions is not only legitimate, but essential, if relativism is to be avoided. 
One limitation of the current article is that it engages primarily with European and North 
American authors, but it is important that debate is extended across cultures, particularly 
because Japan is currently a global leader in humanoid robots. 
None of the arguments above imply that machines cannot participate in human 
moral life. Clearly, they already do so; they contribute to human decision making, they 
carry out tasks delegated to them by humans, and they make some tasks possible which 
otherwise would not be. It seems very likely that the pace of their dissemination in care 
work will accelerate. The question therefore arises: How can responsible design and 
development best be ensured? There are two central strands of MacIntyre’s thoughts on 
practices which are directly relevant. 
First, those who participate in practices are generally well placed to judge what is 
good and best in their practice. Practitioners cannot avoid doing moral philosophy in their 
day-to-day actions, and ‘ethicists’ have no privileged position with regard to standards in 
nursing, for instance, compared to nurses 25. The practical implication of this in the 
development of technology in care work is that practitioners should lead the process of 
design and deployment. Practitioners, here, of course means those involved in giving and 
receiving care. Those who are cared for will be just as central to the development process 
as care givers, so that advocacy becomes a central concern of good design. This supports 
approaches to responsible design which place care workers and user groups at the centre 
                                                 
 
2 My thanks to reviewers of the draft article for reminding me of this. 
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of the design process 55, rather than those which assume the lead position of ‘engineers and 
ethicists’ 52(p.424), as external observers and evaluators of patient care procedures. 
Second, MacIntyre emphasises that the goods and goals of practices are generally 
very different from the priorities of institutions, and these two sets of goals are often in 
tension. For instance, what an organisation commissioning or providing care services 
prioritises as measurable organisational targets (unit cost, number of service users, number 
of visits etc.), may be different from the goals of care workers in terms of the quality of 
human relationships. MacIntyre’s approach does not dismiss the importance of 
organisational goods, but it does draw attention to the difficulty of balancing the priorities 
of practices and institutions. In the context of new care technologies, there is a clear risk 
that the priorities of organisations rather than practices will drive design and deployment. 
These two points indicate the need for a shift in power dynamics. Currently, 
developments appear to be driven partly by the organisational requirements of care 
purchasers and providers, and partly by the commercial prospects for tech companies to 
open up new markets. Care practitioners – givers and receivers of care – rather than having 
a largely reactive role to the introduction of new care technologies need to take a much 
more active role in their design and development. 
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